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ADVANCING AN ADAPTIVE STANDARD OF STRICT
SCRUTINY FOR CONTENT-BASED COMMERCIAL
SPEECH REGULATION
Nat Stern *
Mark Joseph Stern **
INTRODUCTION
In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., the United States Supreme Court
struck down a Vermont law restricting the commercial exploita-
tion by pharmaceutical companies of information acquired about
the prescribing practices of individual physicians.' That decision
marked the most recent step in the gradual elevation of commer-
cial speech from "its subordinate position in the scale of First
Amendment values"' to its status as a form of expression that
routinely enjoys robust protection from the Court. Indeed, the
Sorrell Court intimated that its long-established framework for
reviewing commercial speech regulation-the standard an-
nounced in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission '-embodies a more rigorous review than the inter-
mediate level of scrutiny often ascribed to it.4
This article argues that the Court should continue the progres-
sion of its commercial speech jurisprudence by promulgating an
* John W. and Ashley E. Frost Professor of Law, Florida State University College of
Law; J.D., 1979, Harvard University; A.B., 1976, Brown University.
** Writer, SLATE MAGAZINE.
1. 564 U.S..... 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011).
2. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
3. 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980) (setting forth a four-part test to examine validity of com-
mercial speech restriction). The Central Hudson test is discussed infra notes 46-50 and
accompanying text. The Sorrell Court's application of the test is discussed infra text ac-
companying notes 107-16.
4. See Fla. Bar v. Went for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623-24 (1995); Neil M. Richards,
Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1178-79
(2005).
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adaptive standard of strict scrutiny for content-based commercial
speech regulation. The standard would be adaptive in the sense
that it would take into account commercial expression's distinc-
tive aspects. While strict scrutiny has often been called "'strict' in
theory, [but] fatal in fact,"5 the Court has repudiated that notion
and emphasized that "[c]ontext matters" when applying this level
of review.6 A strict scrutiny standard that accommodates the con-
text of commercial speech would offer a more coherent approach
than Central Hudson's oft-criticized7 multi-pronged test, while re-
taining the most useful aspects of that standard. It would effec-
tively align formal doctrine with the arc of the Court's decisions
in this area-no longer treating commercial speech as a doctrinal
stepchild but rather applying to its regulation broader principles
of expression.
Section I of this article briefly reviews the evolution of commer-
cial speech doctrine from the Court's initial recognition that this
expression is entitled to qualified protection through its increas-
ing willingness to review commercial speech regulation through
the exacting lens of core First Amendment tenets. Section II dis-
cusses the rationale for an adaptive standard of strict scrutiny
and describes the manner in which it could operate. Section III
then describes how this standard could be invoked to invalidate
Food and Drug Administration regulations requiring tobacco
companies to place graphic images on cigarette packages warning
of the dangers of smoking.
5. Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
6. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) (finding that a state university law
school's race-conscious admissions policy was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling gov-
ernment interest); see also Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620-21 (1984) (finding
that local chapters of the Jaycees were neither small nor selective and lacked the charac-
teristics necessary to afford constitutional protection to the decision of its membership to
exclude women).
7. Criticism has focused on the test's asserted inconsistency and unpredictability.
See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, Commentary, A Penumbra Too Far, 106 HARV.
L. REV. 1639, 1644-45 (1993); Robert Post, The Constitutional Status of Commercial
Speech, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5 (2000); Michael R. Siebecker, Building a "New Institutional"
Approach to Corporate Speech, 59 ALA. L. REV. 247, 252 (2008).
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I. THE RISE OF PROTECTION FOR COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Modern commercial speech doctrine was launched by the
Court's landmark decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.8 For nearly two decades
afterward, the Court frequently invalidated restrictions on the
content of commercial speech while sustaining enough regulation
to leave unclear its exact position under the First Amendment.
Since the end of that ambiguous period, however, the Court's vig-
orous enforcement of First Amendment safeguards has over-
whelmingly overturned restrictions on commercial speech. Only
in the realm of compelled disclosure has the periodic impulse to-
ward modified scrutiny from the earlier era persisted.
A. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and Its Dual Progeny:
1976-1995
The Court's ruling in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy formal-
ly brought commercial speech within the ambit of First Amend-
ment protection.9 In the Court's eyes, Virginia's ban on advertis-
ing prescription drug prices clashed with central values of free
expression. 0 Depriving consumers of knowledge about compara-
tive prices, for example, thwarted their capacity for self-
fulfillment by preventing "the alleviation of physical pain or the
enjoyment of basic necessities."" Shrouding prices in secrecy also
interfered with the public's ability to make informed economic
policy decisions essential to democratic governance.' 2 Most con-
spicuously at odds with First Amendment assumptions, it ap-
peared, was the statute's premise that exposure to this infor-
mation would tempt consumers to act in ways that would
8. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
9. Virginia State Board of Pharmacy formally overruled the Court's declaration in
Valentine v. Chrestensen that "purely commercial advertising" does not warrant First
Amendment protection. Id. at 758, 770 (citing Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54
(1942)).
10. Id. at 770.
11. Id. at 763-64; see Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First
Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 879-80 (1963) (asserting that individual self-fulfillment
and self-realization are two fundamental values that justify freedom of expression).
12. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765 n.19 (citing ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)).
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ultimately harm their own interests.13 Rejecting this "highly pa-
ternalistic approach," 14 the Court held that a state may not "com-
pletely suppress the dissemination of concededly truthful infor-
mation about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information's
effect upon its disseminators and its recipients."15
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and its anti-paternalistic
thrust spawned a series of decisions hostile to bans on commer-
cial speech derived from what the Virginia Board disparaged as
the "advantages of their being kept in ignorance."16 In the very
next term, the Court struck down two such laws. In Linmark As-
sociates, Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, the Court held invalid a
township's ban on the display of signs announcing the sale of res-
idential homes.17 The ordinance sought to advance the legitimate
purpose of "stem[ming] ... the flight of white homeowners from a
racially integrated community"18 through illegitimate means:
suppressing specific messages out of fear "that they will cause
those receiving the information to act upon it." 9 More far-
reaching in its practical consequences was the Court's ruling in
Bates v. State Bar of Arizona that a state could not prohibit at-
torney advertising about the price of routine legal services." As in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the state contended in effect
that citizens lacked the sophistication to respond properly to the
forbidden advertisements.2 To the Court, however, such justifica-
tions amounted to the discredited case for "the benefits of public
ignorance."22
13. See id. at 768-69. The state argued that open advertising would lure consumers to
patronize cheaper but less professional pharmacists, upset the stability of pharmacist-
customer relationships, and dampen the entry of talented individuals into a profession
whose practitioners had been reduced to "mere retailer[s]." Id. at 768.
14. Id. at 770.
15. Id. at 773.
16. Id. at 769-70.
17. 431 U.S. 85, 86, 97 (1977).
18. Id. at 86.
19. Id. at 94.
20. See 433 U.S. 350, 353, 384 (1977); see also Horace E. Johns, From Bigelow to Zau-
derer: Steps Along the Way in Attorney Advertising, 22 AKRON L. REV. 173, 177-78, 182
(1988) (discussing state responses to Bates).
21. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 372, 374-75 (asserting that clients could not rely on adver-
tising to make appropriate choice of lawyer because advertisements would "highlight ir-
relevant factors").
22. Id. at 375 (citing Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 769-70 (1976)).
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With efforts to limit lawyer advertising persisting in the wake
of Bates, the Court's invalidation of restrictions became a fre-
quent platform for the denial of state power to shield citizens
from accurate commercial expression for their own putative good.
The Court's objection to condescending assumptions about a cli-
ent's capacity to grasp truthful advertisements disposed of bans
on advertising areas of practice other than in officially prescribed
language,23 listing courts in which an attorney was admitted to
practice,24 self-recommendation for employment to persons who
had not sought an attorney's legal advice,25 inclusion of illustra-
tions in advertising,26 any targeted direct-mail solicitation," pub-
licizing certification by private organizations," and touting one's
credential as a Certified Public Accountant. 29 Even an attorney's
identification in advertising as a "Certified Financial Planner"--
while arguably confusing or misleading absent explanation"-
could not be forbidden where it correctly reflected her status.1
In addition to overturning restrictions rooted in paternalism,
the Court also rejected prohibitions based on rationales unrelated
to distinctive concerns posed by commercial speech. In Carey v.
Population Services International, the Court struck down a com-
plete ban on the advertisement or display of contraceptives.2 The
state's justification that advertisements of contraceptive products
would prove "offensive and embarrassing" ran afoul of the First
Amendment principle that offense to sensibilities does not license
suppression of otherwise protected speech." Likewise in Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Products Corp., the Court struck down a ban on
mailing unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives on the
grounds that homeowners had the same ability to deal with of-
23. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 194-96, 206-07 (1982).
24. See id. at 198, 206-07.
25. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 639, 642 (1985).
26. See id. at 647.
27. See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 476 (1988); see also Edenfield v. Fane,
507 U.S. 761, 763-64, 777 (1993) (striking down a restriction on prohibition of in-person
solicitation by certified public accountants).
28. See Peel v. Att'y Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 96, 110-11
(1990) (plurality opinion).
29. See Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, 512 U.S. 136, 143-44 (1994).
30. See id. at 150-52 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
31. Id. at 138, 145 (majority opinion). The petitioner had been authorized by a well-
known private organization to designate herself in this manner. Id. at 138.
32. 431 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1977).
33. Id. at 701 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)).
2013] 1175
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
fensive advertisements as those exposed to such material in pub-
lic.14 Perhaps the most explicit statement of the Court's unwill-
ingness to automatically exempt commercial speech from the or-
dinary operation of First Amendment principles came in City of
Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc. 5 There, the Court invali-
dated an ordinance barring distribution of "commercial" publica-
tions through freestanding newsracks located on public proper-
ty. 6 Noting that newsracks holding noncommercial publications
produced similar harms to public safety and aesthetics,37 the
Court dismissed the city's argument that the "low value" of com-
mercial speech justified its targeted ban on commercially oriented
newsracks, 5
Moreover, the Court refused to automatically accept, at face
value, the government's explanation for restrictions on commer-
cial speech. In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., the Court rejected the
intent to combat "strength wars" among brewers as a valid justi-
fication for a federal prohibition on displaying the alcohol content
of beer on labels or in advertising. 9 Instead, the Court inde-
pendently assessed whether the ban squared with other provi-
sions of the government's regulatory scheme. Finding inconsist-
encies in that framework, 1 the Court doubted that the labeling
ban could even survive Central Hudson's third requirement that
regulation of commercial speech directly advance the relevant
government interest.4 '2 Even granting that assumption, however,
the Court ruled that the restriction failed because less restrictive
alternatives existed for addressing "strength war[s].
34. 463 U.S. 60, 72 (1983) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted) ("[Tihe short, though regular, journey from mail box to trash can... is an
acceptable burden, at least so far as the Constitution is concerned.").
35. 507 U.S. 410 (1993).
36. See id. at 416-17.
37. See id. at 425-26.
38. Id. at 428 (internal quotation marks omitted).
39. 514 U.S. 476, 479, 488 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Among the less
speech-restrictive alternatives noted by the Court was simply limiting the alcohol content
of beer. Id. at 490.
40. Id. at 488-89.
41. For example, beer companies could still disclose alcohol content in advertisements
in those states that permitted it. Id. at 488.
42. See id. at 486.
43. Id. at 490-91 (noting, for example, direct limitations on the alcohol content of
beer).
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Even as the Court frequently struck down restrictions, howev-
er, it stopped short of equating commercial speech with fully pro-
tected expression; rather, it sought to determine the scope of the
"limited measure of protection" to which commercial speech is en-
titled.44 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy itself acknowledged
state latitude to take measures designed to assure dissemination
of "truthful and legitimate commercial information."45 In addition,
the Central Hudson Court invalidated New York's ban on adver-
tising by electric utilities to promote the use of electricity, relying
on reasoning that seemed to reserve significant power to limit
even truthful commercial speech.46 The Court found that the
blanket ban violated the fourth-and most stringent-prong of
the standard announced in the case": that a regulation not be
"more extensive than is necessary to serve [the state's] interest."48
Still, by faulting the state's failure to demonstrate that "a more
limited restriction on the content of promotional advertising" 9
could not achieve its goal, the Court seemed to suggest that the
state can sometimes suppress accurate information about a legal
product in order to "dampen" demand for it.5°
Moreover, even the level of vigor for the standard's fourth
prong was called into question nine years later in Board of Trus-
tees of the State University of New York v. Fox." The Fox Court re-
fused to characterize that criterion as a "least-restrictive-means"
test.52 Instead, the state need only demonstrate a "fit between the
legislature's ends and ... means ... that is not necessarily per-
44. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,456 (1978).
45. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
771 n.24 (1976).
46. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 571-
72 (1980).
47. Id. at 569-72.
48. Id. at 566. The first three prongs inquire whether the commercial speech meets
the threshold for protection by concerning lawful activity and not being misleading,
whether the interest asserted in the state's justification for the restriction is substantial,
and whether the regulation directly advances that interest. Id.
49. Id. at 570.
50. See id. at 574 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment) (disagreeing with the
Court "when it says that suppression of speech may be a permissible means to achieve"
energy conservation).
51. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
52. Id. at 480-81; see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 817 (4th ed. 2011) ("Under strict scrutiny it is not enough for the government to
prove a compelling purpose behind a law; the government also must show that the law is
necessary to achieve the objective. This requires that the government prove that it could
not attain the goal through any means less restrictive of the right.").
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fect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single
best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the inter-
est served."53
On the other hand, most occasions when the Court sustained
commercial speech restrictions could be understood as recogni-
tions of distinct and dispositive factual circumstances rather than
indulgences of paternalism. The decisions in Friedman v. Rogers54
and San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Committee,5 for example, were consistent with the Court's tradi-
tional deference to government's role as market regulator.56 In
Friedman, the Court found a Texas law barring the practice of
optometry under a trade name justified by the state's interest in
preventing misleading impressions of the nature of a professional
practice." San Francisco Arts affirmed the Olympic Committee's
"legitimate property right" in the exclusive use of the word
"Olympic" in the commercial promotion of athletic events.5 s
Similarly, two decisions upholding restrictions on attorneys' so-
licitation reflected concern with the impact of aggressive behavior
on vulnerable individuals, not the naivet6 of clients. In Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, the Court upheld enforcement of a prohibi-
tion on in-person solicitation of clients "for pecuniary gain, under
circumstances likely to pose dangers that the State has a right to
prevent. " " The case offered little doubt of the presence of undue
influence. Ohralik had approached, uninvited, two young accident
victims to solicit them as clients-one while she lay in traction in
a hospital-and had made secret recordings of his conversations
with them.6 °
Additionally, the Court's ruling in Florida Bar v. Went for It,
Inc.,61 though more debatable," did not appreciably dilute the
53. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
54. 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
55. 483 U.S. 522 (1987).
56. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 124-25 (1942).
57. Friedman, 440 U.S. at 13, 15-16.
58. S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc., 483 U.S. at 541, 548 (internal quotation marks omit-
ted). The statutory right was applied to prohibit promotion of an athletic competition
called the "Gay Olympic Games." Id. at 525-27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. 436 U.S. 447, 449 (1978).
60. Id. at 450-51.
61. 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
62. See id. at 635 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (5-4 decision); Amy Busa & Carl G. Suss-
man, Expanding the Market for Justice: Arguments for Extending In-Person Client Solici-
1178 [Vol. 47:1171
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Court's general resistance to limitations on truthful lawyer ad-
vertising. 3 The decision allowed a ban on personal injury lawyers'
sending targeted, direct-mail solicitations within thirty days of an
accident.64 Though noting the state's interest in avoiding harm to
the legal profession's image, the Court viewed the ban's principal
purpose as keeping "bereaved or injured individuals" from suffer-
ing a "willful or knowing affront to or invasion of the [ir] tranquili-
ty."65 The Court thus distinguished the circumstances presented
by the case from those "situations in which the government is mo-
tivated primarily by paternalism."6 Indeed, the Court emphati-
cally signaled only two months prior to its decision in Florida Bar
that it did not intend to retreat from its anti-paternalistic
stance.67
Admittedly, two decisions from this period permitting re-
strictions on commercial speech did smack of overt paternalism;
both, however, have been undercut by subsequent rulings. In Po-
sadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, the
Court upheld Puerto Rico's ban on advertising for casino gam-
bling aimed at Puerto Rican residents." While such gambling was
legal there, the Court accepted Puerto Rico's rationale that its
residents were "already aware of the risks of casino gambling, yet
would nevertheless be induced by widespread advertising to en-
gage in such potentially harmful conduct."69 This reasoning was
obviously paternalistic, but just as clearly abandoned in later
cases.
70
tation, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 487, 502 (1999) (asserting that reasoning in Florida Bar
contradicted heightened scrutiny of restrictions on commercial speech that the Court had
previously applied elsewhere).
63. See Arlen W. Langvardt & Eric L. Richards, The Death of Posadas and the Birth of
Change in Commercial Speech Doctrine: Implications of 44 Liquormart, 34 AM. Bus. L.J.
483, 516-17 (1997).
64. Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 635.
65. See id. at 630.
66. Id. at 631 n.2.
67. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 491 (1995); id. at 497 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
68. 478 U.S. 328, 345-46 (1986).
69. Id. at 344.
70. See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 509-12 (1996) (plurality
opinion); id. at 531-32 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Dale Carpenter, The Antipaternalism
Principle in the First Amendment, 37 CREIGHTON L. REV. 579, 603-05 (2004); Langvardt &
Richards, supra note 63, at 485 (asserting that 44 Liquormart "sound[ed] ... the death
knell for Posadas and its modes of analysis"). See generally supra Section I.A.
2013] 1179
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The other decision, United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.,7
combined the paternalism of Posadas with Fox's relaxed approach
to the needed congruence between means and end. Edge Broad-
casting upheld enforcement of a federal ban on lottery advertise-
ments by broadcasters licensed in states that did not conduct lot-
teries," notwithstanding that the vast majority of the company's
audience resided in a state that sponsored a lottery.73 The Court
was satisfied that the restriction was reasonably tailored to the
federal policy of supporting non-lottery states' efforts to discour-
age participation in lotteries.74 The Edge Court's reliance on Po-
sadas," however, gives the decision tenuous precedential force.
Furthermore, to the extent that Edge and Posadas imply special
tolerance of speech-restrictive measures to reduce demand for le-
gal vices, their vitality has been drained by later decisions reject-
ing such efforts.76
Finally, one aspect of lesser protection for commercial speech,
spanning both the early and later periods of commercial speech
jurisprudence, is the government's heightened power to compel
disclosure.77 Even while disapproving a paternalistic ban on hon-
est advertising, the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy Court not-
ed that the need to ensure the truthfulness of commercial infor-
mation could "make it appropriate to require that a commercial
message appear in such a form, or include such additional infor-
mation, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent
its being deceptive."78 A later decision clarified that requiring
such content might be appropriate to avoid consumer confusion as
well as deception." In Central Hudson, the Court suggested that
71. 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
72. Id. at 421, 436.
73. See id. at 423.
74. Id. at 429-30.
75. Id. at 434 (citing Posadas de P.R. Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 344
(1986)).
76. See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 571 (2001) (tobacco products);
Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 176 (1999) (casino
gambling); 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489, 510 (1996) (retail price
of alcoholic beverages); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 478 (1995) (alcoholic
content of malt beverages). These cases are discussed infra text accompanying notes 90-
99.
77. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text; see infra notes 130-53 and accom-
panying text.
78. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
772 n.24 (1976).
79. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977) (leaving open the possibility
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directing advertisers to include information about the efficiency
and cost of services offered might serve as a less restrictive alter-
native to the blanket ban on promotional advertising invalidated
in that case.80
The Court's most thorough discussion of compulsory disclosure
of factual information by commercial speakers occurred in Zau-
derer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel.8 There, the Court held
valid rules mandating that advertisements of contingent-fee rates
disclose, where true, that calculation of expenses included court
costs and expenses and that clients would be liable for costs
whatever the outcome of the suit.82 Unlike illegitimate compul-
sions of speech on matters of opinion, the state here had only re-
quired that advertising include "purely factual and uncontrover-
sial information about the terms under which [their] services will
be available."" The Court condoned disclosure requirements "rea-
sonably related to the State's interest in preventing deception of
consumers" if they were not "unjustified or unduly burdensome. " "
Though the Court later held that commercial speech can gain
greater protection from compelled disclosure when intertwined
with fully protected speech,85 that decision did not purport to alter
the application of Zauderer's approach to ordinary commercial
advertising.86
of requiring a warning or disclaimer in the kind of advertisements protected from the ban
in order to avoid misleading consumers); see also In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982).
80. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
570-71 (1980).
81. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
82. Id. at 652.
83. Id. at 651.
84. Id.; see also Colloquy, It's What's for Lunch: Nectarines, Mushrooms, and Beef-the
First Amendment and Compelled Commercial Speech, 41 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 359, 374 (2007)
(statement of Robert C. Post) (arguing that the principle established by Zauderer also
permits mandatory disclosure to promote market efficiency).
85. See Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988) (invali-
dating the requirement that professional fundraisers disclose to potential donors the per-
centage of donations turned over to charities over the past twelve months). But see Bolger
v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 68 (1983) (quoting Cent. Hudson, 447 U.S. at
563 n.5) (stating that "advertising which 'links a product to a current public debate' is not
thereby entitled to the constitutional protection afforded noncommercial speech"); Nathan
Cortez, Can Speech by FDA-Regulated Firms Ever be Noncommercial?, 37 AM. J.L. & MED.
388, 404 (2011) (discussing the problem of "hybrid" speech).
86. See Riley, 487 U.S. at 796 n.9.
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B. From 44 Liquormart to Sorrell: Ascendancy of Robust Scrutiny
Whatever ambiguity marked the Court's approach to truthful,
nonmisleading commercial speech through 1995, Rubin presaged
a more recent regime of steadily vigorous protection. In particu-
lar, the Court's enforcement of a muscular version of Central
Hudson's fourth prong has repeatedly produced invalidation of
government attempts to cloak accurate information about legal
commercial activities. s7 Any lingering discrepancy between com-
mercial speech and fully protected expression can be found chiefly
in government power to compel disclosure."
A trio of decisions involving advertising of legal vices-
potentially vulnerable to suppression in light of Posadas and
Edge--underscore the Court's hardening skepticism to re-
strictions rooted in paternalistic anxiety about consumers' reac-
tions to truthful speech. In a virtual sequel, only a year after Ru-
bin, the Court unanimously struck down a state law forbidding
advertisement of retail liquor prices except at the place of sale.9"
While the Court in 44 Liquormart spoke in a cacophony of voices,
even the mildest of these concluded that the ban failed Central
Hudson's requirement that a restriction be no "more extensive
than necessary to serve the State's interest."91
Three years later in Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n v.
United States, the Court cast an even more critical eye on a fed-
eral law forbidding the broadcast of promotional advertisements
for privately operated, for-profit casinos, regardless of a station's
or casino's location.92 Noting the extent to which federal law al-
lowed certain forms of gambling and broadcast of some kinds of
gambling, the Court chided the government for its "decidedly
87. See infra note 128 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
90. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 489 (1996).
91. Id. at 529 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Three Justices joined Justice O'Connor's
opinion. Id. at 528. Four other Justices, speaking through Justice Stevens, determined
that this "wholesale suppression of truthful, nonmisleading information" had not even met
Ceatral Hudson's third criterion that the restriction be shown to "significantly advance"
the state's interest in promoting temperance. Id. at 488-89, 505 (plurality opinion). Jus-
tice Thomas argued that the First Amendment categorically prohibits "attempts to dis-
suade legal choices by citizens by keeping them ignorant." Id. at 518, 526 (Thomas, J., con-
curring).
92. 527 U.S. 173, 176 (1999).
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equivocal" putative interest in discouraging gambling.9 3 Even as-
suming the authenticity of the federal policy, however, the Court
found the federal scheme for regulating the broadcast of gambling
advertisements "so pierced by exemptions and inconsistencies"
that it foundered on both the third and fourth prongs of the Cen-
tral Hudson analysis.94
Finally, in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, tobacco joined alco-
hol and gambling on the roster of legal substances and activities
whose dangers could not be combatted by unnecessary re-
strictions on speech.95 The case involved an elaborate set of state
regulations designed largely to curb underage use of tobacco
products.96 One feature-the state's limitations on locations of
outdoor advertising for smokeless tobacco and cigar advertising-
failed Central Hudson's fourth prong because the limitations ef-
fectively excluded advertising of these products from large areas
without a showing that this "broad sweep" was needed. 97 In addi-
tion, the Court struck down the state's prohibition of indoor,
point-of-sale advertising of smokeless tobacco and cigars lower
than five feet from the floor of a retail establishment located
within one thousand feet of a school or playground.9 These regu-
lations satisfied neither the third nor the fourth prong of Central
Hudson; the proscribed advertising would be visible to both chil-
dren taller than five feet and those who looked upward.99
Even the government's interest in protecting health has not
justified gratuitous encroachment on truthful speech. In Thomp-
son v. Western States Medical Center, the Court overturned a fed-
eral law permitting pharmacists to dispense compounded drugs
only if the pharmacists did not advertise or solicit prescriptions
for the compounding of a specific drug or type of drug.'l° The con-
dition was attached to small-scale, compounding pharmacies' ex-
emption from the extensive testing to which mass-produced drugs
were subject; advertising was deemed a signal that an operation
93. Id. at 187.
94. Id. at 188-90.
95. 533 U.S. 525, 571 (2001).
96. See id. at 533.
97. Id. at 561-66.
98. See id. at 566 (citing 940 MASS. CODE REGS. § 22.06(5)(a)-(b) (2000)).
99. Id.
100. 535 U.S. 357, 360 (2002). When compounding, pharmacists combine ingredients to
create medication tailored to a particular patient. Id. at 360-61.
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had attained a scale at which testing was appropriate.10 Express-
ing doubt that the condition directly advanced the government's
interest as required by the third prong of the Central Hudson
standard, 1°' the Court proceeded to invalidate the ban under the
standard's fourth prong that restrictions on commercial speech be
no more extensive than necessary.03 To the Court, the govern-
ment failed to show that the ban's asserted purpose could not be
achieved through alternative methods that would not inhibit
speech. 04 And continuing to reject paternalistic rationales, the
majority also rebuffed the dissenters' contention that the re-
striction furthered the government's interest in curbing the sale
of compounded drugs to "patients who may not clearly need
them."'' As in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the First
Amendment did not countenance "preventing the dissemination
of truthful commercial information in order to prevent members
of the public from making bad decisions with the information."' 6
Nearly a decade later, the Court's decision in Sorrell v. IMS
Health Inc. reaffirmed that the aim of safeguarding health would
not sustain first resort to restrictions based on apprehension of
recipients' reaction to truthful speech.0 7 Absent express consent
by prescribers, Vermont's law forbade the sale of "prescriber-
identifiable information" by pharmacies to data-mining compa-
nies, and by data-mining companies to pharmaceutical compa-
nies, "for marketing or promoting a prescription drug."'08 The law
was intended to prevent marketing representatives of pharma-
ceutical manufacturers, known as "detailers," from exploiting
their knowledge of individual prescribing practices when ap-
proaching physicians.' 9 At the same time, the state afforded op-
portunity for the information to be "purchased or acquired by oth-
er speakers with diverse purposes and viewpoints," for example,
101. See id. at 369-70.
102. See id. at 371.
103. Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557, 566 (1980)).
104. Id. at 372-73 (suggesting alternatives such as limiting the amount of particular
compounded drugs that pharmacists could sell in certain periods of time).
105. Id. at 373 (quoting id. at 379 (Breyer, J., dissenting)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
106. Id. at 374.
107. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
108. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4631(d) (2011).
109. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S...,. 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2661 (2011).
[Vol. 47:11711184
COMMERCIAL SPEECH REGULATION
academic organizations seeking to counter the promotion of
brand-name pharmaceutical drugs.1 ' Indeed, legislative findings
accompanying the law showed that its "express purpose and prac-
tical effect are to diminish the effectiveness of marketing by
manufacturers of brand-name drugs.""' The law therefore im-
posed both a "content- and speaker-based" burden on speech."'
Accordingly, the Court reasoned that the restriction warranted
"heightened" scrutiny."' Almost inevitably, the Court concluded
that "[t]he law cannot satisfy that standard.""4 In what might
serve as a synopsis of its logic, the Court observed: "If pharma-
ceutical marketing affects treatment decisions, it does so because
doctors find it persuasive. Absent circumstances far from those
presented here, the fear that speech might persuade provides no
lawful basis for quieting it.""' Thus, whether the Court employed
Central Hudson's standard for commercial speech or "a stricter
form of judicial scrutiny," the underlying principles and outcome
were the same."6
The Court, however, still did not extend enhanced scrutiny of
either sort to compelled disclosures in commercial speech. Only a
year before Sorrell, the Court in Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A.
v. United States upheld a requirement that attorneys who furnish
bankruptcy-assistance services include in advertisements a
statement to the effect that: "We are a debt relief agency. We help
people file for bankruptcy relief under the Bankruptcy Code."'17
The law was designed to avert the misleading impression created
by advertisements that offer debt relief without mention of the
costs associated with a possible bankruptcy."8 In assessing the
law, the Court invoked Zauderer's touchstone that disclosure re-
quirements be "'reasonably related to the State's interest in pre-
venting deception of consumers' and neither "[ulnjustified" nor
"burdensome.""9 Under this "less exacting scrutiny,"20 the gov-
110. Id. at __ 131 S. Ct. at 2663.
111. Id. at __ 131 S. Ct. at 2663.
112. Id. at 131 S. Ct. at 2663.
113. Id. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2667.
114. Id. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2659.
115. Id. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2670.
116. Id. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2667.
117. 559 U.S. - ... 130 S. Ct. 1324, 1329-30 (2010) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 528(a)(4)
(2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
118. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1340.
119. Id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1339-40 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Coun-
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ernment was entitled to require "an accurate statement identify-
ing the advertiser's legal status and the character of the assis-
tance provided." 2'
II. ADAPTING STRICT SCRUTINY To CONTENT-BASED COMMERCIAL
SPEECH REGULATION
Sorrell's emphasis on the First Amendment's aversion to con-
tent-based restraints, together with its suggestion that commer-
cial speech restrictions often trigger "heightened" scrutiny,'22
highlights a central theme of the Court's commercial speech ju-
risprudence: the narrowing gap between the principles that gov-
ern fully protected speech and those peculiar to commercial ex-
pression. This near-convergence can be detected not only in the
Court's intolerance of restrictions on truthful, nonmisleading
commercial speech, but also in the pronouncements that accom-
pany these decisions.
At the outset of modern doctrine, Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy explained in expansive terms the First Amendment
tenet on which the decision rested: "[P]eople will perceive their
own best interests if only they are well enough informed, and...
the best means to that end is to open the channels of communica-
tion rather than to close them."22 A later decision striking down a
restriction on solicitation by certified public accountants had ech-
oed this premise: "[T]he general rule is that the speaker and the
audience, not the government, assess the value of the information
presented." 4 Thus, time and again, the Court has chastised the
government for paternalistic efforts to withhold truthful infor-
mation about legal commercial activities from presumably unwit-
ting consumers."' Likewise, Sorrell's disapproval of governmentpartisanship in the marketplace of ideas drew on reasoning that
sel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985)).
120. Id. at __ 130 S. Ct. at 1339.
121. Id. at., 130 S. Ct. at 1340.
122. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011);
Richard Samp, Sorrell v. IMS Health." Protecting Free Speech or Restricting Lochner?,
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 129, 129-30 (2010-2011).
123. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 415 U.S. 748, 770
(1976).
124. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 767 (1993).
125. See, e.g., Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 565 (2001).
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transcends genres of speech: "The First Amendment requires
heightened scrutiny whenever the government creates 'a regula-
tion of speech because of disagreement with the message it con-
veys.,,,125
The Court's antipaternalism and its broad resistance to unnec-
essary suppression of commercial speech have been implemented
by the growing stringency with which Central Hudson's fourth
prong has been enforced.'27 To reject the restrictions in Thompson
and Sorrell, for example, it sufficed that the Court could conceive
of potentially feasible alternatives for achieving the government's
goal. 128 Moreover, the burden has come to rest on government to
demonstrate the negative proposition that such alternatives
would not serve the government's interest. 129
Accordingly, this article proposes that the Court take the next
logical step in the evolution of doctrine by announcing a formal
standard of strict scrutiny3 ° for content-based commercial speech
regulation. Little strain is required to construe the Court's more
recent invalidations of bans on truthful, nonmisleading commer-
cial speech as government failure to show that the measures were
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. 131 As
Martin Redish and others have long urged, First Amendment
values do not point to separate regimes for commercial and non-
commercial speech.3 2 Of course this principle would have to be
126. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at -, 131 S. Ct. at 2664 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
127. See Kerry C. Donovan, Vanity Fare: The Cost, Controversy, and Art of Fashion Ad-
vertisement Retouching, 26 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 581, 602-03 (2012);
Coleen Klasmeier & Martin H. Redish, Off-Label Prescription Advertising, the FDA and
the First Amendment: A Study in the Values of Commercial Speech Protection, 37 AM. J.L.
& MED. 315, 348 (2011).
128. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2669-70 (noting that physicians can de-
cline to meet with detailers or forego detailing altogether); Thompson v. W. States Med.
Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 371-72 (2002); supra note 104 and accompanying text.
129. See, e.g., Thompson, 535 U.S. at 373 (finding that the government failed to show
that regulations did not restrict speech more than necessary to further state's interest).
130. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774-75 (2002) (stating that
when strict scrutiny applies to restrictions on speech government has the burden of prov-
ing that restriction is "(1) narrowly tailored, to serve (2) a compelling state interest").
131. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. -. -, 130 S. Ct. 876, 898 (2010) (de-
scribing strict scrutiny in these terms); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460,
469 (2009) (same).
132. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 630-
33 (1982) (asserting that commercial and noncommercial speech deserve comparable con-
stitutional protection because both serve the value of self-realization); Alex Kozinski &
Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV. 627, 628 (1990) (con-
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adapted to the "context"13 3 of commercial speech, especially with
respect to the problem of false or misleading speech. Here it is
important to recognize that strict scrutiny does not inevitably en-
tail an undifferentiated weighty burden on government. Rather,
the nature of a subject might make more modest threshold show-
ings appropriate. Adapting strict scrutiny to compelled disclosure
in commercial speech entails departure from the Court's doctrine,
but not from its results.
The Zauderer-Milavetz reasonable relationship standard' is
adequate for typical requirements for pertinent information, but
it does not expressly account for circumstances in which there is a
"realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot."' 3'
Here, it is compulsion rather than suppression that is at issue.
However, the "constitutional equivalence of compelled speech and
compelled silence in the context of fully protected expression " "'
should apply to mandatory commercial speech that raises the
danger of government overreach posed by compelled speech in
other contexts. 37 Moreover, in the commercial setting, suppres-
sion and compulsion often cannot be neatly distinguished; as a
matter of physical space or consumers' attention, government-
required content may crowd out or overshadow an advertiser's
own message. Thus, the government's burden of justification
should be heightened only when compelled disclosures carry faci-
al indicia of aims other than providing consumers with sufficient
information to make informed decisions.
This burden could be triggered by one or both of two factors.
First, as the Court has already stated, the government cannot
impose "unjustified or unduly burdensome" disclosure require-
ments.'38 However, since this is a discrete criterion apart from the
tending that the "commercial/noncommercial distinction makes no sense").
133. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
134. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S . . 130 S.
Ct. 1324, 1339-40 (2010) (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S.
626, 651 (1985)) (holding that disclosure requirements must be "reasonably related to the
State's interest in preventing deception of consumers'" and neither "[u]njustified" nor "un-
duly burdensome").
135. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992) (permitting content discrimina-
tion within proscribable categories of speech when such a possibility is excluded).
136. Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988).
137. See generally David B. Gaebler, First Amendment Protection Against Government
Compelled Expression and Association, 23 B.C. L. REv. 995 (1982).
138. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
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reasonable relationship test, the government's difficulty in satis-
fying it is not clear."9 A compelled disclosure that is reasonably
related to preventing deception can hardly be unjustified,4 ' and
so scrutiny should be focused on its burden. The scrutiny accord-
ed to government-required content should be commensurate with
the content's relative prominence and the cost of including it.
Thus, a requirement that 90% of the advertising space for a cer-
tain product be devoted to warning of its danger might well pass
the presumably permissive reasonable relationship criterion,"'
but the burden on the sponsor's message should evoke a more
skeptical review.
The second consideration is arguably implicit in the reasoning
of Zauderer and Milavetz but was not squarely addressed there.
Zauderer assumed that the required disclosure of costs and ex-
penses incurred by clients mandated the inclusion of "purely fac-
tual and uncontroversial information" about attorneys' services;""
Milavetz, in sustaining the compulsory statements in advertise-
ments that "[w]e are a debt relief agency," likewise appeared to
rest on a similar premise."4 Such a premise itself, however,
should be subject to careful inspection whenever the compelled
disclosure diverges from communication of obviously objective in-
formation. Given the straightforward distinction between legal
costs and fees, Zauderer's disclosure requirement did not warrant
this concern.4 Designation of an attorney who provides bank-
ruptcy-assistance services as "a debt relief agency," 45 though still
139. The Court rejected stricter standards "[b]ecause the First Amendment interests
implicated by disclosure requirements are substantially weaker than those at stake when
speech is actually suppressed." Id. at 651 n.14. However, the Court did not offer any exact
standards the government must meet.
140. See id. at 651 (describing the rational-relationship test); see also Nat'l Elec. Mfrs.
Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001) (using the Zauderer test to find that "[b]y
encouraging such changes in consumer behavior, the labeling requirement is rationally
related to the state's goal of reducing mercury contamination"), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 905
(2002).
141. See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 26 (1989) (quoting Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881 (1985);
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 52, at 553 (describing the rational basis test as "enormously
deferential to the government").
142. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651.
143. See Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United Sates, 559 U.S.____ 130 S. Ct.
1324, 1330, 1340 (2010). ("[Tlhe disclosures entail only an accurate statement identifying
the advertiser's legal status and the character of the assistance provided .. .
144. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652-53.
145. See Milavetz, 559 U.S. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1330-32.
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within the latitude of interpretation afforded commercial infor-
mation, should have aroused more attention to its potential for
conveying an officially chosen viewpoint than it received in Mila-
vetz. One need not categorically transplant principles governing
compelled disclosure in other settings to commercial speech1 41 in
order to recognize potential danger to First Amendment values
when government dictates messages whose content is not un-
questionably a provably true assertion.147 The further a compelled
disclosure strays from this description, the more searching the
scrutiny to which it should be subject.
In support of this approach, it should be noted that the idea of
enclaves of strict scrutiny within a broader standard of less de-
manding review is a familiar one.'48 In equal protection doctrine,
the overwhelming majority of government classifications enjoy
the rational relationship standard's presumption of validity,
49
with heightened scrutiny reserved for suspect classifications like
race 15 and quasi-suspect categories like gender.'5 ' Free exercise
doctrine is perhaps even more instructive. As its central principle,
the Court allows enforcement of valid "generally applicable pro-
hibitions of socially harmful conduct" to religiously motivated in-
stances of that conduct.'52 In some instances involving "hybrid
situation[s]," however, the Court applies strict scrutiny where the
146. See id. at __, 130 S. Ct. at 1343 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 652 n. 14) ("I am skeptical of the premise on
which Zauderer rests-that, in the commercial-speech context, 'the First Amendment in-
terests implicated by disclosure requirements are substantially weaker than those at
stake when speech is actually suppressed.'").
147. See Stephanie J. Bennett, Comment, Paternalistic Manipulation Through Pictori-
al Warnings: The First Amendment, Commercial Speech, and the Family Smoking Preven-
tion and Tobacco Control Act, 81 MIss. L.J. 1909, 1910-13 (2012) (criticizing government
compelled inclusion of graphic images in place of written factual statements).
148. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 52, at 688 ("Rational basis review is the mini-
mum level of scrutiny that all laws challenged under equal protection must meet. All laws
not subjected to strict or intermediate scrutiny are evaluated under the rational basis
test.").
149. See, e.g., U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 174-75 (1980) (discussing the
Court's deferential approach in a number of different cases); City of New Orleans v.
Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) (per curiam).
150. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
720 (2007); Adarand Constr., Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 235 (1995).
151. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 555 (1996) (quoting J.E.B. v. Al-
abama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994)); J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 135.
152. Emp't Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885 (1990).
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Free Exercise Clause operates "in conjunction with other consti-
tutional protections."153
Under an adaptive strict scrutiny for commercial speech, these
enclaves would comprise those compulsions of commercial speech
that are facially onerous or ideologically tinged. While strict scru-
tiny would presumptively apply to suppression of truthful, non-
misleading commercial speech, government would continue in
most cases to have more leeway to require warnings, disclaimers,
and disclosures that reasonably relate to government's interest in
deterring fraud and promoting health and safety. It is only when
the government resorts to mandating commercial speech that
clearly imposes a substantial burden on the speaker, or arouses
real suspicion that the required message strays from objective
communication, that strict scrutiny would be triggered.
III. GRAPHIC IMAGES ON CIGARETTE PACKAGES: AN APT
OCCASION FOR STRICT SCRUTINY
A notable recent example of legislation to which adaptive strict
scrutiny could be appropriately applied appears in the 2009 Fam-
ily Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act.154 One provision
of the Act directs the FDA to develop new disclosures for cigarette
packages that take the form of "color graphics depicting the nega-
tive health consequences of smoking."' These labels are to be ac-
companied by a textual statement warning of the negative health
risks of tobacco use.'56 Together, the illustrations and statements
153. Id. at 881-82.
154. Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123 Stat. 1776 (2009) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of titles 15 and 21 of the United States Code).
155. 15 U.S.C. § 1333(d) (Supp. V 2012).
156. See id. The textual warnings proposed by the FDA were
1. WARNING: Cigarettes are addictive
2. WARNING: Tobacco smoke can harm your children
3. WARNING: Cigarettes cause fatal lung disease
4. WARNING: Cigarettes cause cancer
5. WARNING: Cigarettes cause strokes and heart disease
6. WARNING: Smoking during pregnancy can harm your baby
7. WARNING: Smoking can kill you
8. WARNING: Tobacco smoke causes fatal lung disease in nonsmokers
9. WARNING: Quitting smoking now greatly reduces serious risks to your health
76 Fed. Reg. 36,628 (June 22, 2011) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
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must occupy 50% of the front and back sides of cigarette packag-
es.1"7 Though the statute's requirements may not be inevitably
suspect, their implementation by the FDA provides an apt occa-
sion for application of strict scrutiny. The impact of the images
deviates too far from objective disclosure of pertinent data to earn
the lenient review found in Zauderer and Milavetz.15 Addressing
challenges to these regulations, the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals held them valid,"9 while the District of Columbia Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled them in violation of the First Amend-
ment.6 ° The principles supporting an adaptive standard of strict
scrutiny explain why the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals was correct to strike down the FDA's attempt to compel
speech that far exceeded conveyance of factual information.
A. The Circuit Split
Unsurprisingly, the opposing outcomes in the Sixth and Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuits flowed from different understandings of
the level of scrutiny required by Zauderer in this instance. Read-
ing Zauderer's permissive language broadly, the Sixth Circuit
signaled the government's low threshold of proof: "Deciding
whether a disclosure requirement is reasonably related to the
purpose is all the law requires to assess constitutionality." 6 1 Un-
derscoring the strength of the presumption of validity, the court
later employed the famously government-friendly parlance of ra-
tionality.'16 Under its "rational-basis" analysis, the required tex-
tual and graphic warnings need only have "a rational connection
between the warnings' purpose and the means used to achieve
that purpose." 6' Predictably, the court determined that the warn-
ings were "reasonably related to promoting greater public under-
standing of the risks" of tobacco use.'64
157. 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a)(2) (Supp. V 2012).
158. See Cigarette Health Warnings, FDA, http://www.fda.govfrobaccoProducts/Label
ing/Labeling/CigaretteWarningLabels/default.htm (last visited Apr. 00, 2012) (presenting
the images to be placed on all cigarette packaging).
159. See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 518 (6th Cir.
2012).
160. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
161. See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d at 566-67.
162. See id. at 561-62.
163. Id. (citing Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 115 (2d Cir. 2001)).
164. Id. at 564. The extent to which the court's scrutiny favored the law is indicated by
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In contrast, the District of Columbia Circuit reasoned that the
"inflammatory images" fell "outside the ambit of Zauderer" be-
cause they did not constitute "pure attempts to convey infor-
mation to consumers."16 Rather, the images amounted to "una-
bashed attempts to evoke emotion (and perhaps embarrassment)
and browbeat consumers into quitting." 6 Nevertheless, unlike
the district court below, the court did not rely on strict scrutiny to
invalidate the compulsory warnings.167 Rather, the court decided
that Central Hudson's intermediate standard of review applied.'
Conducting this review with a critical eye, the court concluded
that the government had failed to show that the graphic warn-
ings even directly advanced its interest in reducing smoking,
much less that its regulation of speech was not more extensive
than necessary to serve that interest.'69 The FDA, the court de-
clared, had "not provided a shred of evidence" that the warnings
would directly advance this interest.7 °
B. Application of the Adaptive Standard of Strict Scrutiny
It is understandable that the Sixth and District of Columbia
Circuits applied divergent levels of scrutiny for the speech at is-
sue here. As discussed in Section I, the Supreme Court's commer-
cial speech jurisprudence has left this area with a significant
amount of uncertainty. Under the approach proposed in Section
II, however, the constitutionality of the newly required tobacco
labels can be readily resolved. That approach would produce a dif-
ferent result from the facile validation of these requirements by
the Sixth Circuit's reliance on rational basis review.' 7' Moreover,
its response to the plaintiffs' contention that the size of the required warnings was unduly
burdensome because they would drown out the companies' own speech. See id. at 567.
Denying that the question of burden involved a separate analysis, the court reaffirmed its
conclusion that the warnings were reasonably related to the government's interest in pre-
venting consumer deception. Id. The court also cited the companies' assertion that the
warnings would not reduce demand for tobacco products as evidence that the law did not
unduly burden their speech. Id.
165. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1216-17.
166. Id. at 1217.
167. Compare id., with R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 845 F. Supp. 2d 266, 271,
277 (D.D.C. 2012).
168. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 696 F.3d at 1217.
169. See id. at 1218-20.
170. Id. at 1219.
171. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
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though the District of Columbia Circuit's analysis led to the same
outcome as would the adaptive standard of strict scrutiny, 172 it
left speech vulnerable to later restrictions in a way that the adap-
tive standard would not. By holding that the government had
failed to demonstrate that the required labels directly advanced
its interest in curbing smoking, the court left the door open to the
efficacy of even more frightening images.'73
The critical threshold issue, of course, is the standard of review
to which the label requirement should be subjected. Under the
approach advanced here, the default mild scrutiny of Zauderer
should be confined to compelled provision of objectively verifiable
information-speech based on fact and impartially conveyed.
174
Nutritional information and ingredient lists fall into this catego-
ry, as do current tobacco warning labels.'7 ' Such disclosures sig-
nificantly further substantial governmental interests in prevent-
ing false or deceptive claims and promoting health or safety.'76
Moreover, current tobacco labels and other such disclosures are
not obviously burdensome in conveying vital facts to the consum-
177
er.
These new warning labels, however, are a wholly different spe-
cies of disclosure and thus warrant the adaptive level of strict
scrutiny. The images may be animated by factual realities, but
the images themselves are subjective and dramatic: for example,
the juxtaposition of pictures of healthy and diseased lungs. 178 Un-
like a factual statement, an image does not state a fact; it tells a
story or conveys an emotion. 17
9
172. See supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
173. See generally Recent Case, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205 (D.C.
Cir. 2012), 126 HARV. L. REv. 818 (2013).
174. See N.Y. State Rest. Assoc. v. N.Y. City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114, 131-34 (2d
Cir. 2009); supra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
175. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (2006) (Supp. V 2012).
176. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985); Disc. To-
bacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 541 (6th Cir. 2012); see also Jen-
nifer L. Pomeranz, Compelled Speech Under the Commercial Speech Doctrine: The Case of
Menu Label Laws, 12 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 159, 159 (2009).
177. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
178. For a composite of images proposed by the FDA, see Overview: Cigarette Health
Warnings, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/TobaccoProducts/Labeling/ucm259214.htm (last visit-
ed Apr. 18, 2013).
179. See Emily A. Holmes et al., The Causal Effect of Mental Imagery on Emotion As-
sessed Using Picture-Word Cues, 8 EMOTION 395, 407 (2008) ("The present findings have
provided the strongest evidence, to our knowledge, that imagery has a significantly great-
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Undoubtedly, vivid images are not necessarily frightening and
frightening images are not necessarily nonfactual. For instance,
an image of a tar-marred lung of a lifelong smoker is only fright-
ening if one can recognize what it is-an organ-and why it is be-
ing presented-to illustrate the harm of cigarettes. And the im-
age's frightfulness does not undermine its factual nature; it is
undoubtedly accurate to imply that many who smoke will experi-
ence such lung mutation. What is not factual, however, is the
emotional appeal inherent to such an image.
Yet the distinction between an objective and an emotional
warning may be somewhat obscured by widespread cultural aver-
sion toward tobacco, and so a neutral example proves instructive
here. Consider naproxen sodium, the analgesic contained in
Bayer's Aleve." ° Each bottle of Aleve carries the following warn-
ing: "This product ... may cause severe stomach bleeding."18' This
is a fact, substantiated by clinical tests, telegraphed to the con-
sumer in text, allowing her to weigh the benefits of the drug
against its potential side effects. Imagine now, that in addition to
carrying this disclosure, each bottle of Aleve contained a large
color image of a man vomiting up blood-a common side effect of
stomach bleeding-which in turn can be a side effect of Aleve.
Embedded in that image is an indisputable fact-Aleve can have
this effect -but the picture itself vaults beyond fact to affect the
consumer's emotions rather than her intellect. The same is true of
the FDA's proposed images, and the government acknowledges as
much; it believes that textual disclosures are more memorable
when coupled with a vivid pictorial aid-tacitly conceding that
such an aid will strike a deeper emotional chord with consumers
than mere text. 8' And in attempting to influence the emotions of
consumers by dictating the speech of tobacco companies in this
manner, the government has augmented facts with propagan-
da. 183
er impact on emotion than verbal representations of the same material. Additional self-
report data suggest that images may exert these differential emotional effects in part be-
cause they are more likely to appear similar in form to actual percepts, may recruit epi-
sodes in autobiographical memory, and include personal involvement in events.").
180. See Aleve, BAYER, http://aleve.com/products.php#caplets (last visited Apr. 00,
2013).
181. See id.
182. See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 528 (6th Cir.
2012).
183. See V.A. Gaitonde, Methods of Ideological Suppression, 2 SOC. SCIENTIST 49, 49
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Even an intermediate standard of review-such as that for
time, place, and manner regulations of commercial speech' 4-is
insufficient under these circumstances. That level of scrutiny
could be appropriately applied to compelled disclosures that are
factual but facially onerous to the commercial speaker such as
compelled speech that imposes appreciable costs on the speaker
or detracts from the speaker's ability to project its message. 185
Such a level of scrutiny could apply, for example, if the govern-
ment mandated that liquor companies devote three quarters of
their advertisement space to factual, textual warning labels or
required that the current textual warning labels for cigarettes
dominate the surface of cigarette packages.
Here, however, because the graphic labels are burdensome"6
and not exclusively factual or objective,'87 adaptive strict scrutiny
should apply. In a sense, the standard amounts to a stringent
version of Central Hudson's mandate that the speech regulation
not be "more extensive than is necessary to serve" the govern-
ment's interest in question. 8 While that command as traditional-
ly interpreted allows room for considerable speech regulation, a
stricter reading would force the state to prove why elements such
as the size, style, and phrasing of the disclosure are absolutely
crucial in conveying the state's message. Such a standard should
be triggered when compelled commercial speech on its face is pa-
tently ideological or materially onerous. There can be little ques-
tion that these labels fit both categories.
The images on the labels are designed specifically to discourage
consumers from using the product, not just to warn them of its
risks. ' 9 Moreover, in taking up 50% of each package's space, the
(1974).
184. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994); City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 428 (1993); Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980).
185. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 661.
186. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 845 F. Supp. 2d, 266, 272 (D.D.C. 2012).
187. See supra notes 178-79 and accompanying text.
188. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,
566 (1980).
189. See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 530-31 (6th
Cir. 2012) (quoting Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
31, § 3(2), 123 Stat. 1776, 1781 (2009)) ("[Tlhe purpose of the labels-to provide truthful
information regarding the health consequences of the product in order to decrease 'the use
of tobacco by young people and dependence on tobacco.'"); 155 Cong. Rec. 14169 (2009)
(statement of Sen. Reid).
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labels heavily detract from the tobacco companies' own speech.19
In their subjectivity and prominence, these "disclosures" are
hardly disclosures at all, but rather government-compelled edito-
rials criticizing the product to which they are affixed.' 9 ' In Wooley
v. Maynard, the Court overturned the respondents' convictions
for covering the state's motto, "Live Free or Die," on their license
plate;192 the state could not compel the Maynards to act as a "'mo-
bile billboard" for conveying an "ideological message" that they
found "morally objectionable."'93 Likewise, the graphic labels
heavily interfere with the speech of tobacco companies, forcing
them to serve as billboards for the government's ideology without
proof that less intrusive means of reducing smoking rates are un-
available. "'
Additionally, the graphic images implicate a number of First
Amendment symmetries that may be obscured by the distasteful
nature of cigarettes and their promotion. Here, the adaptive
standard of strict scrutiny is uniquely effective in recognizing the
distinctiveness of commercial speech while adhering to basic First
Amendment principles. Long before affirming the "constitutional
equivalence of compelled speech and compelled silence" for fully
protected expression,19' the Court in West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette had disavowed the notion that "a Bill of
Rights which guards the individual's right to speak his own mind
[allows] public authorities to compel him to utter what is not in
his mind."'96 Zauderer's permissive standard accounts for the gov-
ernment's authority to prescribe useful factual disclosures for ad-
190. See Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d 512, 528-29
(W.D. Ky. 2010); Reply/Response Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees at 38, Disc.
Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc., 674 F.3d 509 (Nos. 10-5234 & 10-5235).
191. For an overview of the Act's requirements, see Overview of the Family Smoking
Prevention and Tobacco Control Act: Consumer Fact Sheet, FDA, http://www.FDA-gov/to
baccoproducts/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/ucm246129.htm (last visited
Apr. 00, 2013).
192. 430 U.S. 705, 706-07, 717 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted).
193. Id. at 715; see Laurent Sacharoff, Listener Interests in Compelled Speech Cases, 44
CAL. W. L. REV. 329, 398 (2008) (describing Wooley as supporting the claim that govern-
ment "may not get free advertising through compulsion").
194. Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that the
label requirement did not even meet the less demanding requirement that the measure
"'directly advanceo the governmental interest asserted.'" R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v.
FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1218-21 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting Cent. Hud-
son Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980)).
195. Riley v. Nat'l Fed. of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 797 (1988).
196. 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943).
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vertisements, and the danger of tobacco products was amply con-
veyed by the older labels containing statements of fact about the
chemicals contained in cigarettes and the diseases they could
cause.197 That latitude, however, does not erode Barnette's injunc-
tion against official attempts to "prescribe what shall be orthodox
in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion."19
As Sorrell's disapproval of Vermont's effort to stack the debate
over prescription drugs demonstrates,1" indicia of such attempts
in any context deserves close judicial review. 00
Concerns that requiring graphic labels constitutes government
overreach are not met by the FDA's contention that the new la-
bels merely change the medium but not the message; the Court
has long recognized that when form and content are intertwined,
a change to one changes the other. In Cohen v. California, the
Court noted that "words are often chosen as much for their emo-
tive as their cognitive force."0 1 The Court, therefore, would not
"sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of the
cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for
that emotive function which, practically speaking, may often be
the more important element of the overall message sought to be
communicated."2' 2 In Texas v. Johnson, the Court rejected the no-
tion that a flag burner could be punished because he might have
made his point in innumerable other ways,03 ruling that it was
the means of his expression that deserved protection.0 4 The "par-
ticular mode in which one chooses to express an idea," the Court
noted, may be just as vital as the message of the expression it-
self.200
Certainly the factual basis behind the old and new disclosure
labels-that smoking has adverse health effects-remains the
197. See 15 U.S.C. § 1333(a) (2006).
198. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642.
199. See supra notes 107-16 and accompanying text.
200. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S ..... 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2663-65 (2011);
supra notes 129-30.
201. 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
202. Id.
203. See 491 U.S. 397, 431 (1989) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) ("[Johnson's] act...
conveyed nothing that could not have been conveyed and was not conveyed just as forceful-
ly in a dozen different ways.").
204. See id. at 404-05 (majority opinion).
205. Id. at 416.
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same.2"6 Yet when that information is communicated through a
gruesome picture instead of a written statement, the message is
fundamentally altered. To read that smoking harms one's health
is to learn of the risks of using tobacco. To see a post-autopsy
corpse with its lungs removed is to be told: "Do not smoke." In ef-
fect, then, tobacco companies are being forced to tell their cus-
tomers, through the traumatic impact of a graphic image, not to
buy what they are selling.0 7 A disclosure designed to repel cus-
tomers from a product by provoking their disgust through a dra-
matic image is one different in kind, not degree, from a disclosure
of fact. As is so often the case in speech, changing the mode of ex-
pression does indeed change the message.2 8
The government has tacitly conceded this point, and in so doing
highlighted the clash between the rationale requiring graphic la-
bels and the antipaternalistic philosophy at the heart of recent
commercial speech jurisprudence. The statute and its regulations
reflect the belief that the old labels are simply not effective
enough to keep people from using tobacco products and that the
new, graphic labels are necessary to reinforce the risks of smok-
ing.2"9 Textual warnings, in other words, are not sufficiently dra-
206. See Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg.
36,628, 36,629 (June 22, 2011) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1141).
207. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of California offers an
analogy. There, the Court barred the state from forcing a company to carry in its billing
statements editorials that were hostile to the company's commercial interests. See Pac.
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1986). The Court stated:
For corporations as for individuals, the choice to speak includes within it the
choice of what not to say.... Were the government freely able to compel cor-
porate speakers to propound political messages with which they disagree,
[First Amendment] protection would be empty, for the government could re-
quire speakers to affirm in one breath that which they deny in the next.
Id. at 16. The FDA's new cigarette labels are, in a very real sense, editorials-even propa-
ganda-and of course they are at complete odds with the interests of tobacco companies.
208. See Johnson, 491 U.S. at 402 n.2.
209. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 696 F.3d 1205, 1221-22 (D.C. Cir. 2012)
(finding that the FDA had not provided enough evidence that the new labels would accom-
plish the objective of reducing smoking rates); see also Commonwealth Brands, Inc. v.
United States, 678 F. Supp. 2d. 512, 530 (W.D. Ky. 2010) (quoting INST. OF MED. OF THE
NAT'L ACADEMIES, ENDING THE TOBACCO PROBLEM: A BLUEPRINT FOR THE NATION 291
(Richard J. Bonnie et. al. eds., 2007)) (noting a statement issued by the Institute of Medi-
cine that cigarette warning labels "'are unnoticed and stale, and they fail to convey rele-
vant information in an effective way'"). The government also claims that its new label re-
quirements are constitutional because the inclusion of graphic images does nothing to
erode the accuracy of the message conveyed by the warnings. Brief for Appellants at 27,
48-51, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. FDA, 845 F. Supp. 2d. 266 (D.D.C. 2012) (No. 11-
5332). This argument raises questions as to how far the FDA can go when developing a
label it deems "effective" in light of its stated goal of using the labels to "effectively convey
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matic to curb smoking rates to the FDA's satisfaction, necessitat-
ing the introduction of more disturbing and memorable labels.
2 10
Having determined that potential smokers will not respond ap-
propriately to truthful information about a legal product, the gov-
ernment has resorted to shouting down tobacco companies' mes-
sage with vivid, frightening images.' While the government's
own speech is unconstrained by the First Amendment,212 it lacks
the same sweeping power to commandeer private channels of
communication to advance its viewpoint. Censorship of truthful,
nonmisleading commercial speech and injection of official belief
into that speech are two sides of the same paternalistic coin.
Neither paternalism nor, of course, the unpopularity of tobacco
companies is any gauge of the protection to which it is entitled
under the First Amendment. On the contrary, it is a truism of
free speech jurisprudence that the courts must safeguard this
right for those whose message resonates least in society. 13 Two
the negative health consequences of smoking on cigarette packages and in advertise-
ments." Required Warnings for Cigarette Packages and Advertisements, 76 Fed. Reg.
36,628, 36,697 (June 22, 2011). The government has obviously decided that only traumat-
ic, grotesque, or emotional images will "effectively" convey this alleged goal.
210. It is true that other products-cleaning chemicals, insect poisons-are required to
display disquieting warning labels (such as a skull and crossbones) to notify consumers of
their toxic nature. See, e.g., Labeling Requirements for Pesticides and Devices, 40 C.F.R.
pt. 156 (2012). The difference between insect poison and cigarettes, of course, is that inges-
tion of insect poison can be immediately fatal, while the negative effects of smoking occur
over years and decades. A person who drinks a gallon of insect poison is in clear and pre-
sent danger of dying immediately; a person who smokes a pack of cigarettes still has years
to quit before experiencing any lethal effects. And while the smoker may be dissuaded
through more speech-through, for instance, a public health campaign to curb smoking
rates-the drinker of rat poison cannot be persuaded to make a different choice before ex-
periencing the fatal effects of her decision.
211. As noted above, even those images fundamentally rooted in fact (most prominent-
ly, the image of the ruined smoker's lung) extend beyond the factual domain when con-
verted into pictorial form. This distinction was noted by the Zauderer Court, which recog-
nized that "[t]he use of illustrations or pictures in advertisements serves important
communicative functions: it attracts the attention of the audience to the advertiser's mes-
sage, and it may also serve to impart information directly." Zauderer v. Office of Discipli-
nary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985). This recognition of an image's dual function-not
only to convey fact, but also to engage a consumer to a degree not necessarily possible with
mere text-further demonstrates why, in the realm of speech regulation, altering the me-
dium alters the message.
212. See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass'n, 544 U.S. 550, 553 (2005).
213. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978) ("But the fact that
society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. Indeed, if it
is the speaker's opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it
constitutional protection. For it is a central tenet of the First Amendment that the gov-
ernment must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas."); Street v. New York, 394 U.S.
576, 592 (1969) ("It is firmly settled that under our Constitution the public expression of
1200 [Vol. 47:1171
COMMERCIAL SPEECH REGULATION
examples, among many, serve to illustrate this bedrock principle.
As noted above, in Texas v. Johnson, the Court overturned a con-
viction for flag-burning as a means of political protest-a form of
expression that reduced the symbol of the nation to ashes. 214 In
Snyder v. Phelps, the Court overturned the defendants' liability
for picketing the funeral of a soldier killed in the line of duty,
though their signs' contention that deaths of American soldiers
reflected God's wrath for the nation's tolerance of homosexuali-
ty-especially in the military215-was surely regarded with near-
universal repugnance.2"' In reviewing the constitutionality of the
FDA labels, then, public disdain for tobacco companies must not
be considered. The government may decide to ban cigarettes alto-
gether, but in the meantime, it cannot warp public opinion by re-
stricting the speech of despised corporations. Protection of "the
thought that we hate" does not exclude purveyors of unhealthy
but legal products." 7
With such core First Amendment principles implicated, only
the tautological proposition that commercial speech deserves less
protection because it is commercial speech precludes the strin-
gent scrutiny of ideologically tinged compelled expression. Appli-
cation of an adaptive form of strict scrutiny, on the other hand,
would be entirely in line with the First Amendment jurispru-
dence over the past several decades-a period during which the
Court has granted increasing protections to commercial speech." 8
Starting with Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and continuing
through Sorrell, the distinction between individual expression
and commercial speech has become even more diminished.2 9 Sor-
rell leaves little question that the distinction between individual
and commercial speech is often thin and artificial, noting that
though "the burdened speech results from an economic motive, so
too does a great deal of vital expression."220 Taking this refine-
ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of
their hearers.").
214. 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989).
215. 562 U.S..... 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1210 (2011).
216. See Lee Ross, Westboro Funeral Pickets are Protected Speech, High Court Rules,
Fox NEWS (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2011/03/02/westboro-funeral-
pickets-protected-speech-high-court-rules/.
217. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see
also supra note 210.
218. See supra notes 87-116 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 9-15, 107-16, 122-29 and accompanying text.
220. Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S __ 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2665 (2011).
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ment of its commercial speech doctrine a step further, the Court
also recognized that often, "the outcome is the same whether a
special commercial speech inquiry or a stricter form of judicial
scrutiny is applied."22' To bring Sorrell to its logical conclusion,
the Court should now acknowledge that general First Amend-
ment principles should apply to commercial speech as they do to
noncommercial speech.
The theory that corporate and economic speech is less im-
portant to the marketplace of ideas than individual speech has
always been a deeply flawed one. The marketplace of ideas in-
cludes ideas about commerce; as the Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy Court observed, "society ... may have a strong interest
in the free flow of commercial information," one which may at
times be "keener by far than [its] interest in the day's most ur-
gent political debate."2 2 Perhaps those citizens who are more in-
terested in cigarettes than in elections number few. But our judi-
cial system has never allowed legislatures to dictate what speech
is most valued by censoring speech that is least desired. The First
Amendment simply does not support the "commonsense" distinc-
tion made between personal and commercial speech.222 Such a dis-
tinction is "commonsense" only if our sense leads to the abridg-
ment of expression we find worthless.224
Perhaps the danger of compelling unwanted speech in order to
manipulate the public's beliefs and actions seems, in this case, ra-
ther insignificant-no more than a "trifling and annoying in-
stance."225 But the dangers posed by a government free to "force[]
speakers to alter their speech to conform with an agenda they do
not set"226 do not end with cigarettes. The burden of unwanted ex-
pression, once condoned by courts, would undoubtedly extend far
beyond tobacco companies. If the government is permitted to
221. Id. at __, 131 S. Ct. at 2667.
222. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
763-64 (1976).
223. Id. at 771 n.24.
224. United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S ... __ 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1585 (2010) ("The
First Amendment... reflects a judgment by the American people that the benefits of its
restrictions on the Government outweigh the costs. Our Constitution forecloses any at-
tempt to revise that judgement simply on the basis that some speech is not worth it.").
225. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
226. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 9 (1986) (plurality
opinion).
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"prescribe what shall be orthodox" 27 by means of compelling
speech unto commercial speakers, it may use its power to manip-
ulate the free flow of information in accordance with its own
wishes. The immediate effects for commercial speech are easy to
imagine: a liquor company could be forced to have three-quarters
of its label bear upsetting pictures of drunk-driving fatalities; a
fast-food restaurant employee could be required to warn patrons,
in language designed to make them squeamish, of the adverse ef-
fects of high-fat meals.
Moreover, the perils of the power to compel this type of speech
extend well beyond such relatively mundane scenarios. Once gov-
ernment is given the power to control the public discourse
through regulation of speech, it may easily distort the discourse
to fit its own agenda. A government politically reliant on oil in-
terests could mandate that all electric cars bear stickers conspic-
uously warning of their limitations compared to oil-fueled cars;
its opponents, once in power, could mandate that all non-electric
cars come with stickers depicting images of the environmental
degradation of oil drilling. A political message may masquerade
as a benign public service announcement, and an attempt to ma-
nipulate conduct may be disguised as a neutral and considerate
suggestion. Once government is authorized to leap beyond fact-
based warnings into compelled propaganda through private in-
struments, its power will not end with the objective goal of con-
veying facts to consumers. The marketplace of ideas will be ma-
nipulated to suit the government's own ends, and free choice of
thoughts and action will be distorted to fit the government's ide-
ology.2 ' Though the process may begin with the tempting goal of
disparaging the noxious product of callous companies, these larg-
er perils loom. As Justice Brandeis warned:
Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the Government's purposes are beneficent. Men born to free-
dom are naturally alert to repel invasion of their liberty by evil-
227. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
228. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977), is again instructive here. See supra notes
192-93 and accompanying text. Empowered to place a state-identifying phrase on license
plates, New Hampshire's government selected a highly ideological message with violent
undertones in the form of its state motto. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 707. When Jehovah's
Witnesses objected, the state refused to revoke the policy, implying that those not willing
to carry the axiom were not good citizens of New Hampshire. See id. at 709 n.6, 717. The
step from a state-identifying phrase to an ideological-even propagandistic-motto in
Wooley may have been small, but the harm it inflicted upon citizens unwilling to express
such a message was substantial. See id. at 713.
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minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious en-
croachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understand-
ing.
229
Cigarettes may be dangerous, tobacco companies obnoxious-
even odious. There is no question that the government's goal of
curbing smoking rates is a worthy one. The Court, however, has
affirmed that in commercial speech, as with other expression,
freedom of speech may not be infringed because the choices it in-
spires are sometimes unwise.20 Government may deploy the for-
midable means at its disposal to discourage smoking, including
loud and pervasive official campaigns and prohibitive taxes.23'
But if ever the state may foist its tendentious message onto pri-
vate speakers, including commercial ones, strict scrutiny de-
mands that this compulsion be government's last resort-not its
first.2 2
CONCLUSION
An adaptive standard of strict scrutiny for content-based com-
mercial speech regulation would remove the uncertainty pro-
duced by formal adherence to Central Hudson's ambiguous
framework. The standard would account for the Supreme Court's
now consistent disapproval of the suppression of truthful, non-
misleading commercial speech. Adoption of this standard would
not contradict the Court's tolerant review of compelled disclosures
that are factual, objective, and not unduly burdensome; rather, it
would clarify that compulsions failing to meet these criteria are
subject to a more demanding level of justification. As the recent
requirement of graphic images on cigarette packages illustrates,
fundamental First Amendment principles-and the danger of
government overreach against which they guard-are relevant to
this realm as well.
229. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
230. See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 769-71 (1976) (striking down a state's ban on advertising by pharmacists even
though doing so might lead to customers choosing low cost, low quality pharmacists and
an end to the pharmacist-customer relationship).
231. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(4) (2006) (requiring the Secretary of Health and Hu-
man Services to "collect, analyze, and disseminate (through publications, bibliographies,
and otherwise) information, studies, and other date relating to the effect of cigarette smok-
ing on human health"); 26 U.S.C. § 5701(a)-(d), (f)-(g) (Supp. V 2012) (taxing cigars, ciga-
rettes, cigarette papers, cigarette tubes, pipe tobacco, and roll-your-own tobacco).
232. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 665-66 (2004) (citing Reno v. ACLU,
521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997)) (describing the least restrictive means test).
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